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Abstract 
 
How should we reflect upon the last 10 years since the completion of the human 
genome? One dominant response from within the humanities and the social sciences 
is to cast these events within a dialectic of promise and disappointment. Indeed, this 
contrast would seem to hold if we take Clinton’s historic announcement as our point 
of departure. I choose an alternative departure: not in the rhetoric of press releases but 
from scientists’ ambivalent accounts of complexity. Perhaps a dialectic of promise 
and complexity is a less pessimistic (but no less sceptical) way of reflecting on what 
has happened in the last 10 years. In this paper, I focus on two aspects of societal 
change within the ‘urban zone’: the rise of population-based biobanking and the 
marketisation of genetic susceptibility testing. Both developments are driven by the 
promise that genomic research will lead to new ways to ‘prevent, diagnose, treat and 
cure disease’. However, genomic knowledge also reveals a level of complexity that 
has led to unprecedented scale in the production of granular information. In the last 10 
years we have seen that traditional bioethics has struggled to cope with this scale. In 
the era of high-throughput sequencing and personal genomics, we have also seen that 
translating complexity into benefits for the health consumer is controversial. 
Arguably, ethical principles do not capture the subtle differences between predictive 
and susceptibility testing, and that more empirical research is needed to understand 
how people perceive and communicate complex risk information.  
 
Introduction 
 
When politicians are given the task of showcasing scientific achievements, optimism 
and hyperbole are often key ingredients of telling a good story. This was certainly the 
case when, on 25 June 2000, President Clinton announced “the completion of the first 
survey of the entire human genome”.2 Leaving aside the familiar tropes of blueprints, 
maps and codes, on that day a central promise was made: “Decoding the human 
genome will lead to new ways to prevent, diagnose, treat, and cure disease”.3 Ten 
years on, the task of this special issue is to reflect on the extent to which this promise 
has been realised and to consider how the ‘societal landscape of genomics’ has 
changed in this period. While holding politicians to their promises is prone to 
disappointment, I want to suggest that we look elsewhere to undertake this task of 
historical reflection. Rather than in the rhetoric of press releases or in the expectations 
of ‘completion’, I want to begin with scientists’ ambivalent accounts of what that 
completed sequence contained: the complexity of DNA.  
 
In February 2001, an article co-authored by Craig Venter and 275 other contributors 
appeared in Science entitled: ‘The sequence of the human genome’.4 This article 
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offered a sobering description of the characteristics of the human genome sequence 
and a more circumspect account of promise. Actually, the ‘major surprise’ that the 
human genome contained far fewer genes than expected (23,000 - 26,000 rather than 
the predicted 50,000 - to 140,000) was not an indication of the reduced complexity of 
the human genome; quite the reverse. It meant that complexity was virtually hidden 
among the diversity of non-linear protein-protein interactions. The provisional map of 
the human sequence provided yet another blow to the ‘gene for’ paradigm: “This 
dynamic system … has many ways to modulate activity, which suggests that 
definition of complex systems by analysis of single genes is unlikely to be entirely 
successful,” wrote Venter et al.5 This cautious statement does not rule out the 
possibility that rare, highly penetrant, genes will be implicated in the pathogenesis of 
some diseases, but it does strengthen the hypothesis that many ‘common’ diseases are 
polygenic and multifactorial: “Thus, there are no ‘good’ genes or ‘bad’ genes, but 
only networks that exist at various levels and at different connectivities, and at 
different states of sensitivity to perturbation.”6 In contrast to the kind of unqualified 
promise made a year earlier, here we see that scientists’ engage in highly moderated 
forms of promising based not on the imperative of translation (i.e. curing or 
preventing disease, etc.) but in overcoming a set of technical problems that have 
suddenly come into view: “The next steps are clear: We must define the complexity 
that ensues when this relatively modest set of about 30,000 genes is expressed.”7  
 
Since Clinton’s historic announcement, we have seen an increasing pessimism 
towards the rhetoric of (genomic) promise. I want to suggest that rather than dwelling 
on a dialectic of promise and disappointment, we could look at the last decade less 
pessimistically (but no less sceptically) in terms of a dialectic of promise and 
complexity. By this I mean that we could examine the societal landscape of genomics 
in terms of various attempts to define, map and exploit genomic complexity; we could 
trace different and competing versions of complexity that engender their own forms of 
promise: future health and wellbeing, autonomy and security, solidarity and social 
justice; public trust and participation.  
 
Complexity is, admittedly, an opaque term that can mean different things to different 
people. In the context of genomics, ‘complexity’ is the probabilistic uncertainty 
arising from multigenic and multifactorial models of disease risk. The uncertainty 
arising from genomic explanations is not simply a matter of identifying all the known 
or hidden factors that contribute to disease, but also recognising the non-linear and 
stochastic nature of gene-gene and gene-environment interactions. The uncomfortable 
(re)discovery of complexity is indeed related to the promise of broadening the scope 
of genomic research to investigate the underlying biology of ‘common complex’ 
diseases. The dialectic of promise and complexity proposed here is one that examines 
the ethical and social challenges arising from the enlargement of promise, especially 
when complexity is denied in the marketisation of risk prediction or when complexity 
increases demands for the collection of human DNA material. 
 
This article examines the last decade of genomics in the context of the ‘urban zone’ – 
the application of genomics in the domain of contemporary healthcare, education and 
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research. It is well beyond the scope of this article to offer a complete map of the 
urban zone. Instead, I will examine the interplay of promise and complexity in two 
main areas: i) population-based biobanks as data repositories for researching genomic 
complexity; and ii) genetic susceptibility testing as efforts to translate complexity into 
risk prediction. 
 
The rise of population-based biobanking 
 
The collection of genetic data on populations and families for medical research has 
existed for more than 30 years. These ‘genetic databases’ were at first relatively 
uncontroversial and small-scale. Since the Human Genome Project (HGP), however, 
the rise of population-based biobanking has become a controversial enterprise. The 
understanding that many common diseases such as cancer, heart disease and dementia 
are ‘complex’ means that research requires an ever-increasing volume of ‘granular’ 
(i.e. detailed) information. Genome-wide association studies (GWAS), for example, 
require much greater statistical power to identify both common and rare variants. This 
involves recruiting much larger samples of DNA – the bigger the better. In this sense, 
biobanks supply the essential capital to meet the increasing scale of population-based 
research.  
 
The new generation of biobanks operates on a prospective basis, involving large-scale 
collections of DNA and personal medical information being held for long periods of 
time and for unspecified purposes. Despite the uncertainties of retaining this kind of 
sensitive information, they hold considerable promise for explaining the complex 
aetiology of common diseases, for improving future health for all, and for providing 
substantial economic benefits for their investors. Not surprisingly, in the last 10 years 
there has been considerable debate about the challenges that biobanks face in gaining 
consent, legitimacy and trust.8  
 
It is not uncommon that when a practice becomes ‘controversial’ its meaning also 
becomes unstable. But controversies are also productive in that they provide an 
opportunity to respecify and stabilise ambiguous meanings. For instance, there have 
been disagreements in the literature about the definition of biobanks (e.g. whether it 
should be replaced by the term ‘genetic database’); they have been connected to a 
whole range of activities (e.g. research in common complex diseases, 
pharmacogenetics, rare genetics diseases, oncology and stem cells, etc.); they are 
embedded in numerous institutions (hospitals, universities, pharmaceutical companies 
and charities); and their global development has been treated with suspicion 
(initiatives have appeared in the UK, EU, Quebec, USA, China, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Japan and Australia). The ambivalent relationship between public and private 
investment has also cast doubt on the legitimacy of biobanks: potentially they are a 
public good but they require commercial investment to actualise this good. To add 
further grounds for scepticism, recent historical events in the UK have eroded public 
trust in science (e.g. mad-cow disease, the GM debate, leaked climate change emails) 
triggering a ‘crisis in trust’.9  
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In the current climate of public scepticism towards science and governance, the 
developers and managers of biobanks face many challenges in establishing 
frameworks that can guarantee data security and win public trust. Such problems have 
thrown into relief the methods of consulting publics and communities and the various 
programmes designed to foster ‘active citizenship’ and ‘participation’ to remedy this 
situation. Some commentators have argued that public engagement projects may 
actually limit debate and be perceived by publics as mechanisms for manufacturing 
consent.10 In the UK, there are particular concerns that public engagement has been 
treated as a kind of ‘risk management strategy’ rather than genuinely involving 
publics in issues of management.11 Furthermore, the ethical and political aspects of 
biobanking have exposed the instability of the category ‘the public’, illustrating the 
degree to which the lingering belief in ‘knowledge deficits’ constitute ‘the public’ as 
ignorant, irrational, selfish and ambivalent.12 
 
An issue that has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature is the process of 
securing informed consent from individuals who donate tissue samples and personal 
information. The events surrounding the Icelandic Health Sector Database in the late 
1990s illustrated the problems arising from presumed consent: that the burden of 
responsibility was placed on individuals to opt out before a certain period to prevent 
their medical records from being included in the Database. In many ways, the 
controversy demonstrated how not to develop a biobank.13 Over the last 10 years of 
biobank development there has been increasing involvement of bioethicists whose 
expertise in policy-relevant knowledge has provided additional layers of oversight. 
But rather than strengthening governance, there have been growing concerns that 
ethical frameworks produce bureaucratic overload, duplication of paperwork, and 
performative accountability.14 Furthermore, traditional concepts of bioethics such as 
informed consent seem to impede research activity because the prospective nature of 
biobanking requires provision for multiple researchers over long periods of time; 
seeking re-consent can be time-consuming and expensive, while the possibility of 
refusals or non-responses can undermine the integrity of research. Some have even 
claimed that continual requests for consent might actually foster negative attitudes 
towards biomedical research.15 Williams argues that in the UK experience of large-
scale biobanking, the focus on informed consent is a distraction from political 
questions about the organisation of medical research or the accumulation of state 
power.16 In the UK, ethical frameworks have opted for ‘open consent’ which affords 
greater flexibility between research and individual autonomy. However, Tutton et al. 
have warned that open consent restricts the rights of participants (and their relatives) 
to withdraw from future research.17 
 
The debate on whether the concept of informed consent captures the relevant tensions 
between the micro and the macro is exacerbated by the enormous scale of genomic 
research. Knopper and Chadwick have argued that “the increase in population-based 
genetic research has led to calls for rethinking the paramount position of the 
individual in ethics”.18 The complexity of the human genome warrants a new 
conceptualisation of ethics based on principles of reciprocity, mutuality, solidarity, 
citizenry and universality. According to this view, people have a duty to participate in 
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biobanks as resources that will benefit future generations of society. The universality 
implied in such notions of public and future good outweighs autonomy as the ultimate 
arbiter. However, debates about whether new approaches to ethical reasoning are 
needed are further problematised by the pivotal role that biobanks play in the 
bioknowledge economy and the globalisation of bioinformation.19 Biobanks can be 
seen as collection points for the harvesting of raw material in the production of 
biovalue.20 The biological characteristics or ‘potentials’ of populations are treated as 
raw materials for economic exploitation. The precise nature of these raw materials is 
that they themselves are unstable or ‘metastable’ boundary objects – in different 
domains and to different actors they can be ‘things’, ‘people’ or segments of 
‘information’. Whether human tissue is the property of the donor (and of potential 
commercial value) or the property of those whose labour is invested (thereby creating 
commercial value) has been debated in case law and legal theory.21 The key tension is 
that if commercial parties stand to profit from human tissue, should individuals from 
whom the tissue is taken be granted property rights to share in these profits? The 
argument that commercial investment in research on common disease is the necessary 
trade-off for significant future benefits is indicative of the way in which universal 
principles of the public good tend to surpass individual rights.  
 
Biobanks have not only attracted ethical and political controversy, but they are also 
linked in complex ways to the politics of (collective) identity and race. Since the 
HGP, some commentators have expressed concerns about the biological reinscription 
of race.22 Rose argues that “race now signifies an unstable space of ambivalence” 
between molecular biology and socio-political identification.23 Despite the 
overwhelming genetic similarity shared across the spectrum of human difference, 
since the HGP it is the minor variations (e.g. single-nucleotide polymorphism - SNPs 
and haplolytes) that have been significantly correlated with disease susceptibility in 
different populations. Even notions of population have been constructed in terms of 
whether their purported genetic homogeneity or heterogeneity are sources of 
‘exchange value’.24 The portrayal of Iceland as genetically isolated and homogenous 
formed part of the promissory value of the Health Sector Database.25 However, a 
different identity politics has been played out in the USA and the UK, where issues of 
ethnic diversity are more prominent. In these countries, tensions between scientific 
methodology and social inclusion have emerged in relation to research on common 
complex diseases. Smart et al. cite evidence that a minority of researchers who 
worked in UK biobanks justified excluding ethnic and racial minority groups on 
methodological grounds (i.e. where race and ethnicity are potentially ‘confounding 
factors’ in homogenous populations).26 In the US, similar concerns have led to 
initiatives to establish biobanks around the needs of specific racial/ethnic groups (e.g. 
African-Americans and Orthodox Jews). With the potential to identify different 
disease susceptibilities among different populations, the issue is not whether genomic 
research will reactivate further stigma and intolerance but how new rationalities and 
technologies of power over life will govern human differences.27  
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Genetic susceptibility testing 
 
If prospective, large-scale collections of genetic and non-genetic information are one 
response to genomic complexity, then another is the translation of these raw materials 
into clinically relevant risk information. The HGP demonstrated both the means and 
the possibility of identifying many thousands of genes of small to moderate effect. It 
confirmed scientists’ suspicions that many common diseases are in fact multifactorial, 
comprising gene-gene interactions as well as gene-environment interactions. This is 
very different from the kind of genetic risk commonly associated with 
presymptomatic predictive testing for Mendelian conditions such as Huntington’s 
disease, cystic fibrosis and Fragile X syndrome. In the absence of a single dominant 
gene, genetic risk is essentially probabilistic and thus calculated on a delicate balance 
of uncertainties. And yet, in the last 10 years, there has been a massive increase in the 
marketisation of genetic susceptibility testing, the central promise of which is to 
predict and prevent disease. These developments are highly controversial for two 
reasons: the uncertainty of probabilistic risk information seriously undermines the 
validity of such tests, and the predictive or diagnostic inferences of such information 
may have an adverse psychosocial impact on individuals and families. The task is to 
consider the ethical and social differences between strongly and weakly predictive 
testing. 
 
The social, ethical, legal and psychosocial aspects of genetic testing have been 
debated since the 1970s. A dominant style of professional ethical reasoning is the 
conceptualisation of ethical principles and disease exemplars. During the 1980s and 
1990s, for example, the extreme scenario of Huntington’s disease (HD) provided an 
ideal exemplar for the development of ethical policy. Boddington and Hogben have 
argued that using HD as an exemplar stresses “a difference in degree of seriousness” 
which “translates into a substantive difference of kind in justifying ethical 
argument”.28 They query whether the selection of other candidate conditions may 
have led to different policy conclusions. We could say that ethical policy for genetic 
testing has been influenced by the mode of inheritance; that is to say, HD was cast as 
an extreme case that exemplified the ‘geneticisation’ of ethical reasoning and the 
privileging of genetic factors over other aspects of a disease condition. Case 
exemplars have also made an impact on ethical discussions in the social sciences. 
Novas and Rose use the example of HD to argue persuasively that rather than 
inducing fatalism and resignation, predictive testing is linked to the creation of new 
forms of subjectivity and ‘genetic responsibility’.29 Rather than viewing genetic 
knowledge as objectifying and repressive, they argue that practices of ‘genetic 
subjectification’ (i.e. the creation of subjects through knowledge/power relations) are 
in fact aligned with the norms of advanced liberalism, which explains why principles 
such as autonomy are frequently used in ethical discussions. They propose that 
genetic knowledge is operating in a political field where subjects are constructed as 
autonomous, prudent, responsible and self-actualising.  
 
So what kind of exemplar might we use in the case of genetic susceptibility testing? 
One candidate for discussion is Alzheimer’s disease (AD). For the last 20 years, there 
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has been consensus among researchers that rare autosomal dominant genes are 
strongly associated with the ‘early onset’ form of dementia. However, in 1993 the 
apolipoprotein E (ApoE) ε4 allele on chromosome 19 was found to be associated with 
an increased risk for the common ‘late onset’ form of AD.30 The presence of ε4 
increases risk of AD up to 15-fold compared to other ApoE polymorphisms. The 
aetiology of AD shows that susceptibility testing is different from predictive testing in 
that risk information is relevant to a much larger population but is much less certain 
than predictive testing.31 Given that there are no treatment options for AD, 
professionals have cautioned against the routinisation of susceptibility testing in 
presymptomatic individuals unless to confirm an AD diagnosis.32 The ethical 
differences between susceptibility and predictive testing may appear to be differences 
of degree rather than kind if we apply principles as our bench mark. However, as 
Evans has noted, principlism is “a method that takes the complexity of actually lived 
moral life and translates this information into four scales by discarding information 
that resists translation”.33 A more informative ethical analysis should consider two 
things: (i) empirical research that explores the actual accounts of people who are in 
some way connected with or concerned about AD; and (ii) an assessment of how 
ordinary people (not just professionals) perceive, describe and recall genetic risk 
information. 
 
The REVEAL study (Risk Evaluation and Education for Alzheimer’s disease) was the 
first randomised controlled trial designed to evaluate the impact of susceptibility 
testing using ApoE ε4. The study was conducted at four sites in the USA between 
2004 and 2006. At one site, 162 asymptomatic adults who had an affected parent were 
randomly assigned either to receive or not receive susceptibility testing. Both groups 
were measured for symptoms of anxiety, depression and test-related distress six 
weeks, six months and one year after (non) disclosure.34 The results showed no 
significant differences between the two groups, although those who received a 
negative result showed significantly lower levels of test-related distress than did the 
positive group.35 A separate study compared the results of the REVEAL subjects with 
those who received monogenetic testing;36 subjects who learned that they were 
positive for the susceptibility gene experienced low levels of distress similar to those 
who tested positive for the monogenetic test. They also found that “both susceptibility 
and deterministic genetic testing appeared to be well-tolerated by using disclosure 
protocols that provided screening, education, counselling and follow-up”.37 In the 
ethnographic arm of the study, Locke et al. raised questions about the relevance and 
comprehension of testing: 
 
Among the majority of people whom we interviewed in this project, 
the late onset of the disease and the pressures of daily life, often 
involving care giving, combined with the inherent uncertainty of the 
scientific knowledge, encourage most people to set aside worries 
about what the future has in store for them.38  
 
We can draw a number of inferences from this preliminary data. It is widely 
recognised that epidemiological information has a small impact on risk perception 
because probabilistic information is not meaningful to people. People often simplify 
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or condense complex information in order to retain the essence of its meaning.39 The 
characteristics that impress themselves upon risk perception are those which are 
linked to dread or which are already familiar to people.40 In the case of predictive 
testing for Mendelian disorders, the low uncertainty of information coupled with the 
genetically exceptional nature of the test produces high impact of risk perception and 
low recall error. For susceptibility testing for complex disorders, the high uncertainty 
of information coupled with information about lifestyle are likely to dampen the 
impact of risk perception, resulting in high recall error. There is no empirical evidence 
at this stage to suggest that susceptibility testing is psychosocially harmful, but the 
REVEAL study does confirm that receiving a positive result for either the rare or the 
common gene is ‘well tolerated’ when disclosure is mediated by genetic counselling.  
 
As tests for multifactorial diseases become increasingly available to the public, it will 
become important to develop strategies for presenting risk information that can 
communicate increased levels of uncertainty. The emergence of the personal 
genomics industry and the marketisation of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing 
raise serious concerns that vendors do not acknowledge or communicate the 
uncertainty of probabilistic risk information. These concerns are especially relevant 
when DTC marketing blurs the distinction between ‘medical diagnosis’ and ‘health 
information’, between ‘health prediction’ and ‘risk estimation’. For instance, McGuire 
et al. reported that approximately one-third of all respondents in a survey of social 
networking users considered the information obtained from personal genomics testing 
to be a medical diagnosis.41 Other studies have shown how techniques of 
argumentation, distraction and persuasion are employed in the promotion of 
prescription drugs.42 The major concern is that DTC advertising is more profitable 
when misleading the public about the effectiveness or safety of health-related 
products and services. By extension, selling genomic knowledge directly to 
consumers creates expectations about diagnosis, treatment and prevention which are, 
as yet, scientifically undeliverable.43  
 
In the DTC model of susceptibility testing, the relationship between promise and 
complexity is configured in such a way that the uncertainty of probabilistic risk 
information does not seem to impair promises of ‘prevention’ and ‘self-knowledge’; 
this is because the version of complexity they recruit in their marketing strategies is 
one that strips out the problem of non-linear or stochastic interactions between genes 
and environment. The uncertainty of risk information is merely ‘complicated’ (partial 
and incomplete) and assumes that risk profiles will become more accurate as more 
information is added over time. This, rather impoverished, version of complexity does 
not account for epistasis, pleiotropy and polygenicity.  
 
Conclusion 
 
At the beginning of this article, I argued that a dialectic of promise and complexity is 
perhaps a more suitable way of framing recent advances in genomic medicine. 
Placing the events of the last decade within the discursive poles of promise and 
complexity seeks to draw attention away from an overly pessimistic orientation based 
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on profound disappointment. The completion of the Human Genome Project signalled 
both the widening of a new research agenda and the enlargement of promise as 
scientific inquiry oriented its attention to investigating the underlying biology of 
common complex diseases. In contrast to the unqualified promises made by 
politicians in 2000, a more circumspect account of progress is found among the 
accounts of the scientists themselves, wherein gene function and gene expression are 
described in terms of their sobering ‘complexity’. The two case studies I have 
considered show that the problems of overcoming complexity of common diseases on 
the one hand, and sustaining promise on the other, require a systematic attempt to 
augment the supply of human DNA samples to increase statistical significance of 
large-scale research studies. It also shows the rather limited and controversial attempts 
to commercially extract promissory value from genomic data.  
 
Whether we see the turn to complexity in the life sciences as a matter of discovery or 
of construction, the main issue is that scientists’ uncertainty about the human genome 
demands an unprecedented volume of information pertaining to a whole population. 
This is not just information about a population but information for a population – 
public goods that may improve health and prevent disease for future generations. In 
the last 10 years, we have seen the apparent difficulties of traditional bioethics in 
meeting these challenges of scale. The rapid global sharing of information is placing 
increasing pressure on scientists, administrators and ethicists to abandon principles 
based on individual autonomy (i.e. informed consent) and to adopt more flexible and 
universal principles based on notions of solidarity, reciprocity and collective 
responsibility. These issues have been sharply foregrounded in recent debates about 
the international ‘harmonisation’ of biobanks. On the one hand, there are pragmatic 
arguments that relaxing ethical governance to facilitate global flows of bioinformation 
and international collaboration will assist genomic research.44 On the other hand, 
there is a deep mistrust that we are witnessing the remobilisation of technoscientific 
power and that bioethics is incapable of matching this power.45  
 
Perhaps the most significant advance in the last 10 years has been the explosion of 
genome-wide association studies (GWAS) and the ubiquity of the ‘SNP’46 as the 
statistical unit of common genetic variation. GWAS have yielded highly robust 
information, identifying susceptibility alleles for common disorders such as diabetes, 
heart disease, Crohn’s disease and several common cancers. However, the majority of 
risk factors discovered by this method make up only a moderate contribution to 
overall risk.47 Many markers have yet to be discovered, which points to what some 
have described as the ‘missing heritability’ of common complex diseases.48 Such 
knowledge gaps render the clinical application of genetic susceptibility testing suspect 
and limited. In the urban zone of personal genomics, there are concerns that the 
complexity of common diseases, or this missing heritability, will not be properly 
communicated to the consumer, especially when concealing uncertainty is more 
profitable. Ethical analysis must distinguish the difference between weakly and 
strongly predictive testing which, it has been argued, cannot be accomplished by 
ethical principles alone. If the promise of predicting common complex diseases is the 
future of genomic medicine, then understanding how people perceive, feel, remember, 
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describe and communicate complex risk information should be on the agenda of 
future ELSI research.  
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